Asian studies
https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/a-nuclear-north-koreas-wake-up-call/
https://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/81837
https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/revising-japans-peace-constitution-much-ado-about-nothing/
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/01/japans-north-korea-challenge-in-2020.html
https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/rethinking-japan-south-korea-defense-relations/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-06-20/why-is-china-s-xi-meeting-north-korea-s-kim-video
Improving the prospects for a peninsula peace with greater security
George A. Lopez
My sincere thanks to the Korea Global Forum for Peace for inviting me to offer these reflections at this prestigious panel today. Other speakers have highlighted the various dimensions of this intractable dispute between the DPRK and ROK which have prevented a permanent end of war declaration or a full peace treaty. As a scholar of peace research and peacebuilding, and who in practice has dealt with United Nations attempts to control nuclear developments in North Korea, let me offer my observations on what might improve peace prospects on the peninsula.
I argue today that the escalating tensions and missed opportunities over the past five years must be addressed more creatively, more consistently, and especially with a full scale process plan of achieving some form of peace declaration, and even denuclearization, in the future.
The dramatic increase in the nuclear capability of the DPRK since 2015 in both real nuclear weapons and in delivery systems via medium and long range missiles means that Kim Jong un, despite his partial diplomatic isolation and the bite of punishing sanctions, is in a stronger position to resist peace negotiations with Seoul or Washington than ever before. Whether it be his bargaining with ROK over multiple issues unique to the North-South agenda or with the US, regarding mutual denuclearization, we all know that Kim can be unmovable. Complicating this is that Washington now states complete denuclearization as a prerequisite for arriving at new security arrangements. However, DPRK will not yield on its nuclear weapon systems before major other concessions, especially in sanctions, occur and a significant new security arrangement guaranteed. Or, it might not yield on cherished nuclear systems at all. This latter prospect makes forging some level of peace accord among all actors in the region a high priority. To attain that – or more far reaching accomplishments – demands a new, proactive smart diplomacy aimed to break this stark deadlock by developing a very new approach to DPRK.
The cornerstone in this new approach – as strong allies must have – will be greater diplomatic cooperation between Washington and Seoul in all matters related to DPRK and peace and security in the region. And the same must then be forged by the US, among those regional actors who in the past were engaged in the six party talks. I am viewing these not through a lens of the past or with any naivete about how difficult it will be to make progress on peace and security with North Korea. But I am certain that to increase that possibility will require a redefined vision and more engaged role of the United States toward ROK first and foremost. In addition, to rebuilding a constructive relationship with nearby parties, the United States must shift its own approach to engaging with DPRK in a number of critical ways.
The first order of business is to declare an end to the US-DPRK leader to leader summit diplomacy to solve our collective search for a peace declaration and other de-escalation measures leading to any level of denuclearization. Rather, each state should set up lower level working groups that begin tackling the difficult issues that require consistent, shared work to reach incremental agreements from which national leaders can build further. Such continuing work can also increase the space for DPRK and ROK similar level working groups, especially regarding the replacement of the armistice with a modern peace treaty.
Similarly, the US must recognize the failure of maximum pressure sanctions to produce denuclearization or improve DPRK behavior. To ensure that such a major policy shift has bargaining utility in dealing with the North will demand a whole new process framework in which such changes or concessions can stimulate more movement towards peace. I believe the basic contours of such a new process exists if we polish off and adapt a bit the framework which laid the groundwork for the early nuclear arms control treaties between United States and the then Soviet Union some six decades ago. This inventive communication and action-reaction process is called the Graduated and Reciprocated initiatives in Tension Reduction [GRIT]. The GRIT framework invites rival parties, however serious their disagreements, to acknowledge even minimally, their shared interest in war avoidance and an openness to negotiated settlement of their disputes. And it establishes how early, unilateral ‘concessions’ can provide incentives to a stubborn foe to undertake even the slightest reciprocal concession.
But here is the key: to move beyond the intense distrust and hostility among foes, GRIT requires one of the parties to assume unilateral leadership in the process of de-escalation. The time for such US leadership has come. As the lead nation in a GRIT strategy, the US would announce forcefully and without ambiguity or qualifiers, its commitment to end our security crisis and nuclear standoff with DPRK without resort to war or military first strikes. The US would then demonstrate the seriousness of that declaration by calling the concerned nations of the region – China, Russia, South Korea and Japan – to a summit meeting designed to outline a multifaceted peace strategy to entice the North Koreans to discuss such proposals. That would be followed quickly by an invitation to Kim Jong Un to respond to this new initiative in kind, and to provide a sign of its own interest in defusing tensions by joining a multiparty dialogue about a more secure future for all.
Recognizing the problem involved when long-term enemies try to halt hostilities, GRIT posits that if Pyongyang does not reciprocate to these initial positive moves, the US and its allies should propose a third – and if needed – a fourth initiative/concession toward reconciliation. These actions could come from any of the Northeast Asia nations involved and provide opportunities for renewed bi-lateral engagement with neighbors that aims to incentivize North Korean cooperation. These exchanges would provide momentum to well-conceived confidence-building measures that lead to major, results-focused negotiations. Somewhere in these first rounds of quid pro quo actions, solidifying an end or war declaration or a full-fledged peace agreement ending the Korean War would occur. Such an accomplishment should make more acceptable for discussion of proposals like sanctions suspension, a freeze on testing and military exercises by all sides, and other de-escalation actions. These accomplishments, in turn, may make it more possible to design some denuclearization measures step, by step, by step.
Making such smart, unanticipated unilateral concessions to create new possibilities was employed by President John Kennedy when he proposed ending US atmospheric testing as a first step in a full reset of the escalating nuclear arms race with the Soviets. He was met with dozens of elite US critics. But he went forward with the testing termination. It became the foundation of stable relations and led to future arms control between the superpowers henceforth.
In moving from intractable conflict to a peace accord, in his unprecedented trip to Jerusalem in 1977, Anwar Sadat took a courageous unilateral step. His visit began a cautious, step-by-step process of dialogue and cooperation between Egypt and Israel that culminated in the Camp David Accords.
I am certain that a new ROK-US partnership can move this creative diplomatic paradigm forward. And that within it lies the long desired end of the Korean War and a peninsula at peace.
